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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1954 TERM
Courts have generally held that abandonment must be persistent and stubborn,
rather than an isolated act.3 An offer to return, if made in good faith within a
reasonable time after the original act, will relieve the abandoner. 4 As a consequence, when a wife makes an offer to return, the husband must accept the offer
or thereby abandon her.5
Although the trial court had rendered judgment for the husband in the
instant case, the Appellate Division found that the wife's offer was made in good
faith and within a reasonable time (two weeks) after leaving, so her actions did
not constitute an abandonment, since they had not "frozen. into a permanent
attitude"; the judgment of the trial court was therefore reversed, 6 leaving the
parties in their original position.
The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the Appellate Division, and
determined that since the wife's actions did not constitute an abandonment the
husband was bound to accept her offer to return, and his failure to do so constituted an abandonment on his part.
A dissent voted to affirmn the judgment of the Appellate Division. Although
neither the opinion of the Court of Appeals nor the memorandum decision of the
Appellate Division gives a full account of the facts, the dissent would seem to be
unfounded, since the facts as given leave no doubt that an abandonment did take
place and the question would seem to be only which party was at fault.
Support and Remarriage
Plaintiff wife had been married to defendant; a divorce was granted her with
provisions for support as previously arranged in a separation agreement, until
she should die or remarry. Five years later she did remarry, and so advised
defendant. Subsequently her second marriage was annulled, on the grounds that
her husband was still legally married, and after a short time she brought this suit
to renew her support from her first husband. Judgment was rendered for the
husband
The basic problem before the Court was whether a marriage declared a
"nullity" could still constitute a remarriage for purposes of the support provisions.
The Court was faced with their decision in Sleicher v. Sleicher,8 which had decided
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an identical situation in favor of the wife, adopting the legal fiction that the
annulment "related back" to the beginning of a marriage and the marriage was
considered never to have existed.9 Even in that case, however, the legal fiction
was modified, since the husband was required to pay only from the time of the
annulment rather than throughout the entire second marriage. 10
The Court pointed out that the decision in the Sleicher case was the only
means of allowing the wife a source of support, since at that time no support
could be had from an anulled marriage." However, after the Sleicher case, the
Civil Practice Act was amended to permit a court to grant support in an annul2
ment action.1
The fundamental function of alimony is to provide support for a wife not
otherwise supported, and in New York alimony automatically ceases upon
remarriage; 13 the subsequent fortunes of the remarriage do not affect this.' 4 The
purpose of the Sleicher holding was only to remedy the one situation in which
a wife had no source of support. By the amendment of the Civil Practice Act the
legislature itself corrected the defect; thus the Court of Appeals felt that the
justification for the Sleicher decision had ended. Al in all normal cases of remarriage under New York law, the wife must look only to her last husband for
support.
The Court recognized the unfortunate repercussions of their decision in the
instant case, since the second husband had died while the action was pending,
but nevertheless felt that the plaintiff was "no different from any other woman
whose source of support has come to an end through death."'r
Medical Care of Children
In a proceeding by the Commissioner of Social Welfare to obtain custody
of a twelve year old boy whose father, because of his personal philosophy, refused
to allow an operation on the son's hairlip and cleft palate, the Court (reversing
the Appellate Division) 16 reinstated the Children's Court decision. 17 Although
9. Id. at 366, 167 N.E. at 502.
10. Id. at 371, 167 N. E. at 503.
11. See Jones v. Brinsmade, 183 N. Y. 258, 76 N. E. 22 (1905).
12. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1140-a.
13. It would seem that New York is in the minority on this point. The
majority of courts hold that remarriage is a ground for modification, but does
not automatically stop alimony. Morgan v. Morgan, 211 Ala. 7, 99 So. 185 (1924).
See annot. 64 A. L. R. 1273 (1929).
14. Nelson v. Nelson, 282 Mo. 412, 221 S. W. 1066 (1920).
15. 308 N. Y. at 226, 124 N. E. 2d at 295.
16. In re Seiferth, Jr., 285 App. Div. 221, 137 N. Y. S. 2d 35 (4th Dep't 1955)
17. 127 N. Y. S. 2d 63 (1954).

